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Abstract. What are the main variations in the constitutional control of the executive in 45
parliamentary democracies and how can these differences be accounted for? Four com-
peting hypotheses, based on dichotomies, explain the degree of this control by means 
of contrasting institutional settings: consensus democracy versus majoritarian democracy,
presidentialism versus parliamentarism, thick versus thin constitutionalism and established
versus new democracies. These hypotheses are tested with the help of fuzzy-sets that allow
for varying degrees of membership that go beyond the presence/absence suggested by these
dichotomies. The necessary and sufficient conditions for constitutional control are specified
with the help of this new methodology. The fuzzy-set analysis shows that the degree of 
constitutional control can be explained solely by a specific combination of institutional 
conditions stemming from the four dichotomies, and not by one single dimension. This con-
stellation remains hidden for the traditional correlational techniques like regression. Hence,
the fuzzy-set logic presents a promising new tool for comparativists that can be used to
reveal causalities.
Introduction
The increase in the number of democratic states during the 1990s has made
modern democracy more varied. New democracies have adopted constitutions
with a wide variety of executive-legislative relations. Central to these relations
is constitutional control: the formal powers of parliaments and Heads of State
to constrain executive behavior. Most of the existing studies on constitutional
control are limited to Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) or a particular region in the world. The scope of
this study is much broader because it seeks to capture the variations of con-
stitutional control in a representative group of countries in which parliaments
(whether fused with or separated from the executive) play a substantial role
in the shaping of the policy-making process.
Since the democratization in Central and Eastern Europe and parts of
Asia, a large number of new democracies have been established that are not
always similar to established democracies. Four of the newly democratized
states of former Soviet-controlled Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria,
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Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia) have installed parliamentary executives that
are drawn from and responsible to the assembly. A further four (the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia) have ‘dual executives’, partner-
ships between presidents and prime ministers with varying degrees of legisla-
tive and executive powers. The remaining 19 states in this region and ex-Soviet
Central Asia have presidential executives. It is significant that the presiden-
tial, rather than the parliamentary, executive type has been adopted most often
by newly democratized states, including most of the Southern European ones
(Liebert & Cotta 1990; Derbyshire & Derbyshire 1996). An exception to this
trend has been South Asia where, since 1988, Pakistan and Bangladesh have
moved from presidential to parliamentary executives.
The aim of this article is to examine and explain the variations in consti-
tutional control in a full population of democracies that fulfill certain criteria.
In order to accomplish this, four well-known hypotheses are selected to
explain these variations. These general hypotheses have in common that they
seek to trace the main institutional differences between modern democracies.
They take a central place in the political science literature, but as they con-
tradict each other, it is interesting to know to what extent they are able to
account for differences in constitutional control. Hence, the focus is on this
causal chain of conditions and an outcome:
• The conditions are the structural factors that determine the executive-
legislative relations.
• The outcome is the constitutional control of the executive by parliaments
and Heads of State.
The analysis will ultimately tell us to what extent the diversity in constitutional
control of modern democracies can be accounted for by dichotomous causal
explanations.
I expect that the explanatory power of the four dichotomies is weak
because they cannot capture the full complexity of modern constitutional
control. A multitude of conditions is determining the type and degree of 
constitutional control so that one has to examine various conditions at the
same time. Moreover, the degree to which structural factors are present should
be studied by means of membership grades instead of mere presence or
absence.
In order to enable such a multicausal explanation of constitutional control
with partial memberships, the scores of the conditions and the outcome are
transformed into so-called ‘fuzzy-sets’. Fuzzy-sets are sets with elements
whose membership grades can have any real value between ‘0’ and ‘1’. They
allow for varying degrees of membership that go far beyond the
presence/absence indicated by dichotomies. Fuzzy-sets are used, among other
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things, to determine the conjunctural causation (combinations of conditions)
of an outcome. More specifically, fuzzy-set logic (Ragin 2000) is applied to dis-
cover causal patterns (i.e., necessary and sufficient causal conditions) behind
the variations in constitutional control.
It is expected that the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991)
has made constitutional control even more diverse (i.e., a multitude of con-
stitutional conditions constrains governments to a higher or lower degree) so
that simple dichotomies do not hold anymore. Instead, modern democracies
are complex constellations, integrating a mixture of institutional devices that
can be used to control the executive. For this reason, it is expected that vari-
ations of constitutional control are not caused by one single factor or dimen-
sion, but by a combination of conditions that can be revealed more precisely
with the help of fuzzy-sets rather than with crisp sets (= Boolean or dichoto-
mous scores) because fuzzy-sets are based on membership grades. One should
note that this article does not simply present the standard critique of dichoto-
mous measures, but more importantly it is a critique of monocausal explana-
tions tied to dichotomous measures. The remedy advocated here is to use
fuzzy-sets and to examine causal conditions configurationally.
Monocausal explanations and dichotomous measures
In the present-day debate on executive-legislative relations, several hypothe-
ses are proposed to account for variations in the distribution of formal powers
of governments and parliaments:
• Majoritarianism versus consensus democracy (Lijphart 1999): In consen-
sus democracies, power-sharing is the central device used to enhance the
cooperation between divergent minority groups in segmented societies.
The opposite model is majoritarian democracy, which concentrates all
political power in the winning party. Consensus democracies enlarge the
room to maneuver of parliaments compared to majoritarian democra-
cies, and their governments are expected to be weaker because they are
built on coalitions. Majoritarian countries are characterized by weak par-
liaments and by executive dominance as expressed by cabinets that stay
in power for a relatively long time.
• Old versus new democracies (Schmidt 1999): The difference between
established and fragile democracies has become more important than the
juxtaposition of consensus and majoritarian democracies. This hypothe-
sis explicitly contradicts the previous one, stating that the divide between
majoritarianism and consensus democracy cannot account for major 
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differences (especially in terms of political performance) of modern
democracies. In established democracies, parliaments are more devel-
oped and better equipped to perform legislative tasks and to counteract
the executive than in new democracies (Schmidt 1999: 291). In the
context of this article, this hypothesis is applied not to the performance
of parliaments, but to their formal powers. It is expected that newly
developed democracies distinguish themselves from established democ-
racies by the many constitutional provisions installed in order to limit
the power of executives.
• Thick versus thin constitutionalism (Lane & Ersson 2000): This hypoth-
esis also contradicts the first one, but on different grounds. It states that
thin constitutions (mainly characterized by division of powers as institu-
tionalized by the Westminster state) enhance strong legislatures because
the division of power principle entails that the legislature has to compete
with the other two main state organs. Thick constitutions, on the other
hand, restrict the room to maneuver of parliaments (and governments)
because of their rigidity as expressed by a fundamental bill of rights and
special protection of minorities.
• Parliamentarianism versus presidentialism (Linz 1994): Linz argues that
the performance of presidential regimes is far lower than that of parlia-
mentary regimes. In addition, the room to maneuver of parliaments is
much higher in parliamentary as opposed to presidential regimes. Pres-
identialism is conducive to a weak party system, which in turn strength-
ens the dominant position of the president and the chance of political
instability. The main reason is that presidentialism is based on dual
popular legitimation which may result in a deadlock between president
and parliament because both are (in)directly elected and are mandated
to pursue policies. It is assumed that the more powers are assigned to
the president, the weaker is the parliament. In this article, this hypothe-
sis is applied to semi-presidential regimes in which the government is
responsible to parliament.1
The four juxtapositions have in common that they seek to account for differ-
ences in constitutional control of the executive in a monocausal and exclusive
fashion. The focus is on one single factor that accounts for the strength of par-
liaments and governments. There are several reasons why these dichotomies
offer at best partial explanations.
First, the dichotomies refer to ideal types that hardly exist in their pure
form because their characteristics are getting more and more mixed in modern
democracies (Dunleavy & Margetts 1995). Devolution in the United
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Kingdom, centralism in the Netherlands and a Mixed Member Proportional
System in New Zealand are all examples of systems drifting away from their
ideal-type image. Second, the degrees of presidentialism, consensus democ-
racy and constitutional rigidity vary significantly so the classification of demo-
cratic regimes is problematic. For example, how much legislative and/or
executive presidential power is needed in order to classify a system as semi-
presidential? Finally, the effects of constitutional arrangements on parliamen-
tary strength are not unequivocal. For example, Lijphart (1999) assumes strong
parliaments in consensus democracies. However, case study analysis has
shown that the parliament’s position is seriously weakened by the majority’s
duty to support the coalition government (the osmosis between parliament
and government) (Keman 1996; De Winter 1998). On the other hand, the role
of government backbenchers can also be conducive to parliamentary strength
in cases where consultation forces the government to modify its proposal in
order to safeguard its support in parliament (De Winter 1993; Mezey 1998:
784). For this reason, it is not too obvious that the underlying rationale of
Lijphart’s hypothesis is correct since the effects of the institutions of consen-
sus democracy on parliamentary strength are not always the same. This does
not mean that dichotomies should be rejected altogether because ideal-types
can help the researcher to establish a threshold between the ‘0’ and ‘1’ values
of fuzzy-sets (Kvist 1999).
So, how can fuzzy-sets help to classify systems and measure the diversity
of constitutional control in a parsimonious way? Dichotomies resemble the
Boolean analysis from which fuzzy-set social science has originated. In
Boolean analysis, the scores ‘0’ and ‘1’ are assigned to denote either the 
presence (‘1’) or absence (‘0’) of a phenomenon under investigation. This
dichotomization has the disadvantage of a large information loss since 
phenomena are rarely either completely present or completely absent.
Dichotomies are even more simplifying than Boolean scores. Whereas
Boolean analysis aims at the identification of constellations of causal condi-
tions, dichotomies are based on a single cause or dimension. This mono-
causality is problematic because the interactions between legislatures and
executives are complex and embedded in institutional settings that may
weaken or strengthen constitutional control.
Given these complexities, both crisp set and fuzzy-set analysis are better
equipped to incorporate institutional conditions that may facilitate constitu-
tional control than simple dichotomies (i.e., bivariate analysis). The fuzzy-set
approach is particularly well suited for identifying, categorizing and measur-
ing complex patterns of similarities and differences across cases. The study 
of diversity is the main strength of this methodological strategy due to its
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capacity to measure partial memberships. Note that fuzzy-sets are not only
superior to dichotomous scores, but also to interval scales because fuzzy-sets
involve calibration (e.g., defining what is ‘full’ membership). Conventional
interval scales are not calibrated in this way since all that matters is that they
vary, which is a prerequisite for correlational analysis. Crucial for the calibra-
tion of membership is that it has a substantive rationale that clarifies why
which scores are assigned to which cases.
Constitutional control in a democratizing world
Fuzzy-sets can be derived from existing scorings and operationalizations.
Before doing this, it is necessary to have a closer look at both the meaning and
variations of constitutional control of the executive.
The exploration of variations in constitutional control is based on a new
data set that comprises several variables on the interactions between 45 par-
liaments and executives during the period 1945 to 1998 (Woldendorp et al.
2000). Included are solely parliamentary or semi-presidential democracies
where the government is (fully) responsible to parliament.2 Whereas parlia-
mentary systems are based on the principal of power-sharing between 
governments and parliaments, in semi-presidential systems either the parlia-
mentary government or the president directs government actions. All of 
the countries included meet the conditions of democratic government, in par-
ticular free elections, civil rights (formal and in practice) and the supremacy
of the Rule of Law by means of a constitution.
The data set includes a broad range of institutional features of parliamen-
tary government, including the role of Heads of State, the state format and
organization, the structure of parliament, relations between the executive 
and legislature, decision rules in parliaments and the role of referendums, and 
features of governments. Following Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996), the
selected democracies can be subdivided into:
• parliamentary executives drawn from and responsible to the assembly
which makes these governments formally accountable (n = 29);
• limited presidential executives where the presidency is the executive with
powers limited by the need for the approval of parliament for certain
executive actions (n = 8); and
• dual executives (also referred to as ‘semipresidential’ or ‘premier-
presidential’ – see Shugart & Carey 1992: 6–7) in which the executive
consists of a working partnership between the president and the prime
minister (n = 8).
paul pennings
© European Consortium for Political Research 2003
547
The borders between these types are not always clear – for example, a dual
executive with a weak president functions as a parliamentary system (Mezey
1998: 781). Of the selected countries, most of the limited presidential and dual
executives are rooted in new independent states, most of them breakaways
from former Soviet countries.
According to the IPU-Parline database, there were 180 national parlia-
ments operating in May 1997 (Copeland & Pattersen 1998: xix). Many of these
parliaments do not meet the regular criteria for democracy, especially those
in communist and one-party states. The countries included in the analysis have
in common that the government is ultimately responsible to parliament. Of
all selected countries, 55 per cent are uninterrupted democracies (since inde-
pendence) and 45 per cent have been interrupted or experienced drastic
changes in their constitution. Hence, the included countries are very diverse
in history and, as such, the universe of discourse is quite uncommon in the
field of parliamentary research.
There are at least three types of constitutional control (Mény 1996:
121):
• partisan control, voiced by the opposition, which is only effective under
conditions in which the government is vulnerable;
• non-partisan control by means of parliamentary oversight which may
take numerous forms: questions, committees, hearings and so on;
and
• control with a penalty, like a motion of censure, which is most drastic, but
cannot be used often without destabilizing the system.
In this article, the focus is on constitutional control with a penalty which occa-
sionally occurs prior to government actions (ex ante accountability such as
votes of investiture), but more frequently as a reaction to government per-
formance (ex post accountability such as votes of no confidence). The avail-
able data are limited to formal procedures and do not reveal how these
procedures are actually used (Mezey 1998). Formal powers of legislatures are
in themselves important enough to study (Laver & Shepsle 1994: 134; Sartori
1994). The reason is that ‘the constitutional state requires that legislatures
define themselves in relation to the executive and the judiciary and maintain
the basic pattern of the balance of power typical of the Rule of Law’ (Lane
& Ersson 2000: 288). Or, as Gallagher et al. (1992: 28) conclude: ‘The fact that
. . . governments must be able to survive in the legislature is, when all is really
said and done, what makes . . . politics democratic.’ Hence, in the constitu-
tionalist view, it is worthwhile to study formal powers of parliaments and exec-
utives as they are.
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Constructing fuzzy-sets
Charles Ragin has recently opened the gate for a new major advancement in
comparative social science by introducing the fuzzy-set approach, which seeks
to transcend the gap between case-oriented and variable-oriented research in
a more advanced manner than the earlier Boolean approach (Ragin 1987,
1994, 2000). Whereas variable-oriented research tends to stress the study of
lawful relationships between variables as the main purpose of social science,
case-oriented research tends to advocate an idiographic view in which all cases
are different. This particularistic bias is not shared by the fuzzy-set-oriented
approach, which argues that it is possible to identify and characterize types of
cases and to present these in a parsimonious way. Nonetheless, Ragin’s
approach (both crisp sets and fuzzy-sets) shares one key preoccupation of
qualitative analysis: to take into account fully the richness and specificity of
each individual case (Ragin 1987).
The fuzzy-set approach allows partial membership of a case in a given con-
figuration. The cases’ membership scores reflect the degrees to which cases are
in or out of sets, where ‘0’ is fully out, ‘1’ is fully in and ‘0.5’ is the cross-over
point, being neither more in nor more out. The membership of a case – here
a country – can vary from being fully in to being fully out of the sets. Because
the estimation of the values of constitutional variables like presidentialism,
constitutional rigidity, and so on is not fully precise due to measurement prob-
lems and lack of comparative data, I use value sets with only seven levels of
membership: ‘1.00’ fully in, ‘0.83’ mostly but not fully in, ‘0.67’ more or less in,
‘0.50’ neither in nor out, ‘0.33’ more or less out, ‘0.17’ mostly but not fully out
and ‘0.00’ fully out.
By allowing for partial membership, sets become ‘fuzzy’ in contrast to
‘crisp’. The majority of consensus democracies, for example, may neither
qualify to be fully out of majoritarianism nor fully in consensus democracy.
The fuzzy-set approach is suited to capture the complexities of modern democ-
racies, which dichotomies evidently fail to do. The main differences can be
summarized as follows:
• Dichotomies are monocausal in assuming that one single dimension
accounts for the variations under study (but note that configurations of
dichotomies could solve the problem of monocausality).
• Contrary to simple dichotomies, both fuzzy-sets and crisp sets allow for
a multicausal explanation by combining multiple causal conditions into
one equation.
• Fuzzy-sets have the same multicausal focus as crisp sets and additionally
allow for partial memberships, which makes them more precise.
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Fuzzy-sets are constructed on the basis of the original scores in the data set.
In order to clarify the partial membership of cases, an overview of the opera-
tionalization of the outcome and the conditions is given.
The outcome ‘constitutional control’ is based on a combination of formal
powers of parliaments and Heads of State. Because of the central role of this
variable, its composition will be discussed in detail. With respect to the formal
powers of parliaments, it is important to note that parliamentary government
is a fused system, meaning that there is no straightforward separation of
powers as in most presidential systems (Shugart & Carey 1992; Andeweg &
Nijzing 1995; Kurian 1998). Parliament and government should not be seen as
two independent entities, but as two overlapping bodies (King 1976; Andeweg
& Nijzink 1995). The modes of interactions between parliament and govern-
ment depend on the power divisions within and between parliament and 
government. Basically, there are three modes of interactions: the government
dominates parliament, the parliament dominates government, and the parlia-
ment and government are balanced.
The basic variables that constitute these legislative-executive relationships
are:
• The role of the vote of investiture: when this is constitutionally required,
it imposes a barrier on the executive when there is no majority in par-
liament (De Winter 1995).
• The vote of confidence: this procedure can be used by both parliaments
and governments in order to achieve their goals (Huber 1996).
• The role of the Head of State: in particular, the formal powers in relation
to the parliament and government (Shugart & Carey 1992).
Most parliaments have the right to exert a vote of investiture or a vote of (no)
confidence, but the combination of both a vote of investiture and the vote of
(no) confidence, however, is mainly seen in three types of ‘new’ democracies
– namely the defeated nations that rebuilt their democracy after the Second
World War (Germany, Italy), the successors to (fascist) dictatorship (Spain,
Portugal) and, finally, post-communist democracies.
Of the 21 countries in which both types of votes do exist, no less than 15
belong to the new and previously interrupted or drastically changed democ-
racies. Obviously, the need to strengthen parliament was felt most profoundly
in these new democracies. The experience of an authoritarian regime has led
to new constitutions in which the parliament was given relatively high control
over government (Maddex 1996). The main exceptions are the post-colonial
democracies that mostly do not have a vote of investiture.
Until now, the focus has been on parliamentary strength, but constitutional
control is more encompassing than that because it also incorporates the formal
explaining constitutional control of the executive
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role of Heads of State. This role is the extent to which the Head of State can
influence the composition and continuation of a government. Powers are not
only exerted from parliaments to governments, but also the other way around.
These formal powers are measured by taking into account whether govern-
ments can ignore losing a vote of confidence and whether governments and/or
Heads of State can dissolve parliament.
Constitutional control is operationalized by combining all these factors into
one composite index of the relative strengths of executive and legislative
powers (as is explained in detail in the Appendix). The scores range from -
1.5 to +1.5. The higher the score, the more governments are restricted in their
room to maneuver. It is an institutional measure based on formal powers
anchored in the constitution. The creation of a seven-value fuzzy-set is
straightforward because the composite index also has seven values. The
crossover point (0.5) is assigned to countries where the executive-legislative
relationship is in balance (i.e., where the score = 0).
The conditions are derived from the four hypotheses discussed earlier. The
contrast between majoritarianism and consensus democracy is operationalized
with the help of two variables: the effective number of parties and the type of
government. The latter is the percentage of governments led by one party that
takes all government seats. The higher this percentage, the higher the degree
of majoritarianism. The means of the scores on both variables, of which ‘type
of government’ was inverted, constitute a new index which measures the struc-
tural preconditions for consensus democracy (and not so much actual coop-
erative behavior within consensus democracy) (Armingeon 2002). The
reduction of consensus democracy to this single variable is justified because it
is a summary of Lijphart’s first (executives-parties) dimension, which is core
to the idea of consensus democracy. Lijphart’s second (federal-unitary) dimen-
sion adds institutional features to consensus democracy that are contested
(e.g., federalism and decentralization are found in both consensus and majori-
tarian democracies). Our summary measure has the advantage of the concept
becoming uni-dimensional and straightforward in its interpretation.
The correlation with Lijphart’s first (executives-parties) dimension (being
0.79) is high enough to claim that it is suited to be a proxy for the conditions
of consensus democracy. Lijphart assumes that the number of parties corre-
sponds more or less linearly with the strengths of parliament and government.
The more parties there are, the more likely the chance of coalition govern-
ments which strengthens the power of parliaments. The second variable (‘type
of government’) is added to correct for those cases where one-party cabinets
occur in multi-party systems. The correlation between both variables is very
high (0.91). Fuzzy scores are created by dividing the scores into seven groups
with the highest scores for Switzerland, Italy, Israel and Belgium. As expected,
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the lowest scores are occupied by the Commonwealth countries. Hence the
calibration of membership in the set of ‘consensus democracies’ has a sub-
stantive rationale, namely that low scores are assigned to countries commonly
identified as majoritarian and higher scores to countries that are more 
consensual.
The division between established and new democracies is operationalized
by the year in which a democratic regime was established. Normally, extreme
values influence the outcome of statistical analyses but, in the case of fuzzy-
sets, this distortion does not occur because all scores are forced into the same
range from ‘0’ to ‘1’. In this case, ‘0’ is assigned to the older democracies and
‘1’ to the newest democracies which gives the calibration of the fuzzy mem-
bership scores in this set a clear substantial rationale. A score of ‘0.5’ is
assigned to regimes that were established between 1945 and 1950. The higher
this score, the younger the democracy. It is expected that new democracies
have equipped parliaments with relatively more formal powers than estab-
lished democracies in order to prevent a fallback into forms of authori-
tarianism or dictatorship.
Thick versus thin constitutionalism concerns the decision rules with regard
to constitutional change and the existing reviewing process within the polity.
The more requirements that have to be met in order to change or amend the
constitution, the more rigid the constitution. The rationale for the fuzzy-set
scorings is that extremely flexible countries with an unwritten constitution
(Israel, New Zealand, the United Kingdom) are scored ‘0’ whereas extreme
rigid countries where the amendment of the constitution is loaded with many
requirements are scored ‘1’. The measure of Woldendorp et al. (2000) has five
scores, ranging from ‘1’ (most rigid) to ‘3’ (most flexible). A large group of 36
countries has scores between ‘2’ and ‘2.5’. By comparing these scores with
Lijphart’s measure of constitutional flexibility (Lijphart 1999), two new cate-
gories are created in order to be able to differentiate within this large group.
In this way, seven more or less homogeneous categories are created. The
higher the score, the more rigid the constitution.
Finally, the juxtaposition of presidentialism and parliamentarism is based
on the degree of presidential power. The legislative and non-legislative powers
of presidents are measured by Shugart and Carey’s index (Shugart & Carey
1992; Strøm & Neto 1999). The resulting index is the sum of a selection of leg-
islative presidential powers (e.g., veto power, decree powers) and executive
powers (e.g., cabinet formation, cabinet dismissal, dissolution of the assembly).
In most cases, executive powers are more decisive than legislative powers: the
share of legislative powers among the 45 countries is only 21 per cent. This
measure of presidential power is, despite its limitation to formal powers,
more informative than the simple dichotomy between presidential and 
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parliamentary systems that neglects the crucial variations in degrees and types
of presidential powers. The rationale for the calibration of the fuzzy mem-
bership scores is based on the degree of presidential power. The score ranges
from ‘0’ (no president; n = 18) to ‘17’ (maximum presidential power). The 27
countries with a president are subdivided into six groups of four to five coun-
tries on the basis of the degree of presidential power (as reported by Shugart
& Carey 1992).
Table 1 presents an overview of all fuzzy-set scores of the conditions and
the outcome. It clearly shows that situations in which the parliament domi-
nates over government are rare. They are mainly found in countries that expe-
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Table 1. Fuzzy-set partial membership scores of the dependent and independent variables (1998)
Constitutional Consensus New Rigid
Country control democracy Presidentialism democracy constitution
Australia 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0.83
Austria 0.33 0.5 0.5 0.33 0.67
Bangladesh 0.33 0.17 0.17 1 0.67
Belgium 0.17 1 0 0.17 0.67
Botswana 0 0 1 0.67 0.17
Bulgaria 0.67 0.5 0 1 0.17
Canada 0.33 0.17 0 0.17 0.83
Czech Republic 0.5 0.5 0.83 1 0.17
Denmark 0.5 0.83 0 0.17 0.5
Estonia 0.67 0.83 0.33 1 0.17
Finland 0.17 0.83 0.67 0.33 0.67
France V 0 0.67 0.5 0.67 0.5
Germany 0.67 0.5 0.17 0.5 0.83
Greece 0.5 0.33 0.67 0.83 0.5
Guyana 0.17 0 0.33 0.67 0.67
Hungary 1 0.67 0 1 0.33
Iceland 0.17 0.67 0.83 0.33 0
India 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.5 0.67
Ireland 0.5 0.33 0 0.33 0.5
Israel 0.83 1 0 0.5 0
Italy 0.67 1 0.67 0.5 0.33
Jamaica 0.33 0 0 0.67 0.67
Japan 0.33 0.17 0 0.5 1
Latvia 0.83 0.83 0.17 1 0.67
Lithuania 0.17 0.33 0.33 1 0.33
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rienced forms of authoritarianism (Hungary, Macedonia and Latvia). The
weakest parliaments (with a score of ‘0’) are always found in combination with
a president. There are, however, also examples of weak parliaments (with a
score of ‘0.17’) that have no president at all (Belgium, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom). Hence, weak parliaments cannot be explained with the help
of only one single factor, as will be shown in more detail later. Most common
are situations in which the legislative-executive relations are balanced or when
the government dominates over parliament. Apparently, most countries do not
wish to constraint the government too much in order to guarantee the ample
room to maneuver needed to achieve effective policy-making.
explaining constitutional control of the executive
© European Consortium for Political Research 2003
Table 1. Continued
Constitutional Consensus New Rigid
Country control democracy Presidentialism democracy constitution
Luxembourg 0.5 0.67 0 0.17 0.33
Macedonia 1 0.5 0 1 0.67
Malta 0.33 0 0.17 0.83 0.33
Namibia 0.17 0 0.83 1 0.33
Netherlands 0.5 0.83 0 0.17 0.67
New Zealand 0.17 0.67 0 0.17 0
Norway 0.5 0.67 0 0.17 0.67
Pakistan 0 0.17 1 0.83 1
Poland 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.33
Portugal 0.5 0.17 0.67 0.83 0.67
Romania 0.5 0.83 0.33 1 1
Russian Federation 0.5 1 1 0.33
Slovakia 0.67 0.83 0.83 1 0.17
Slovenia 0.33 0.83 0.5 1 0.17
South Africa 0.5 0 0.67 1 0.67
Spain 0.5 0.33 0 0.83 0.33
Sri Lanka 0.17 0.33 1 0.83 0.33
Sweden 0.5 0.67 0 0.17 0
Turkey 0.17 0.5 0.17 0.83 1
United Kingdom 0.17 0 0 0 0
Notes: Constitutional control: the higher the score, the more constraints are put on governments.
Consensus democracy: the higher the score, the higher the level of consensus democracy. Presi-
dentialism: the higher the score, the more powers are assign to the president. New democracy: the
higher the score, the newer a democracy. Rigid constitution: the higher the score, the more rigid a
constitution.
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Necessary and sufficient conditions of constitutional control
The overarching hypothesis of this article is that dichotomies are too crude to
account for variations in constitutional control. Fuzzy-sets enable us to tran-
scend the dichotomy of either weak or strong parliaments. Instead, more vari-
ation in the degree of constitutional control is allowed in order to identify the
circumstances in which parliaments and/or Heads of State are granted formal
powers. The causation is expected to be conjunctural or multicausal, meaning
that combinations of the four hypotheses cause varying degrees of constitu-
tional control by parliaments and Heads of State.
There are two kinds of causal conditions that may account for constitu-
tional control: those that are necessary and those that are sufficient. Fuzzy-
sets enable the identification of these conditions by means of the so-called
‘subset principle’: a condition is necessary when its score is consistently higher
than the outcome (the outcome is a subset of the condition); and a condition
is sufficient when its score is consistently lower than the outcome (the condi-
tion is a subset of the outcome). This logic can be illustrated by a routine
example. All successful politicians are popular, but popularity as such is not
sufficient for success. In order to be successful, politicians must also obey party
discipline, avoid scandals, etc. Hence, popularity is a necessary, but not a suf-
ficient, condition for success.
In the case of necessity, every instance of constitutional control should
involve the presence of a causal factor (Braumoeller & Goertz 2000). The
reverse situation is not always true since a cause can be necessary without
being sufficient. In that case, additional factors are needed to produce the
outcome. Sufficiency means that a particular combination of conditions may
produce a relatively high level of constitutional control, but, at the same time,
there may be countries with the same level of constitutional control where this
combination is absent, meaning that other combinations are relevant too. Dif-
ferent combinations of conditions can be linked to the presence of constitu-
tional control (the so-called ‘multiple conjunctural causation’) (Ragin 1987).
Fuzzy-sets scores offer a parsimonious way to identify necessary and suf-
ficient conditions because they enable the application of the subset principle.
In the case of necessity, the outcome is a subset of the cause (Yi £ Xi or, if the
outcome is present, then the cause is also present). In the case of sufficiency,
it is the other way around: the cause is a subset of the outcome (Xi £ Yi or, if
the cause is present, than the outcome is also present). A score on the outcome
should not be lower than the level set by the score on relevant sufficient 
conditions.
In reality, strictly necessary and sufficient conditions will be exceptional.
Ragin (2000) has introduced the concepts of ‘quasi-necessity’ and ‘quasi-
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sufficiency’ in order to enlarge the applicability of the fuzzy-set logic. In many
cases, the measurement of membership scores is imprecise, especially in the
middle range. These imprecisions are taken into account by incorporating an
‘adjustment factor’. Given the seven-value fuzzy-sets, I have chosen an adjust-
ment factor of ‘0.17’. In order to constitute a violation, a case’s membership
in the outcome must exceed its membership in the causal condition by more
than 0.17 fuzzy-membership points.
The ‘quasiness’ of necessity and sufficiency is further invoked by statistical
tests that use benchmark proportions. The benchmark refers to the propor-
tion of cases that are consistent with the argument being tested. As it is plau-
sible that there are exceptions to the rule, a benchmark of, for example, ‘0.80’
is specified. This means that a causal combination is claimed to be ‘almost
always’ sufficient in 80 per cent of the cases where the causal combination
applies. The lower the benchmark and the higher the adjustment factor, the
larger the analytical distance to the concepts of necessity and sufficiency. A
causal condition can be interpreted as sufficient for constitutional control, with
an adjustment of 0.17 fuzzy-membership units, if Xi - 0.17 £ Yi. Logically, a
necessary condition is always part of the logical statement summarizing pat-
terns of sufficiency.
The computer program FS/QCA3 is used to identify the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for the degree of constitutional control. In the case of nec-
essary conditions, the analysis is based on a test proportion of 0.80 (‘almost
always necessary’), a significance level of 0.05 and a fuzzy adjustment factor
of 0.17. The absence of presidentialism turns out to be a necessary condition
for constitutional control of the executive (see Figure 1). This necessary con-
dition is plausible because a strong presidency implies that there are few
formal constraints on executive power. However, the absence of a strong pres-
ident is not sufficient as this does not automatically imply that the executive
is bound by formal powers of parliaments and/or Heads of State.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for constitutional control can be
examined with the help of scatter plots that show the distribution of the 45
cases along the condition and the outcome. In a perfect plot with an unad-
justed diagonal, we expect all cases to be under (in case of necessity) or above
(in case of sufficiency) the diagonal. The fuzzy adjustment factor raises the
diagonal 0.17 points above or below its normal position (i.e., a straight line
going from corner to corner) so that more points are consistent with the
adjusted diagonal. Figure 1 is a two-dimensional plot with the outcome (‘con-
stitutional control’) and the condition (‘no or weak presidentialism’). The
lower-triangular plot shows that the absence of a strong president is a quasi-
necessary condition for a high score on constitutional control of the executive.
The combination of strong presidents and strong parliaments is unlikely.
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However, there are some instances in which the values of the outcome are
higher than the cause. Four countries outside the margin of the adjustment
score of 0.17 (i.e., Yi £ Xi + 0.17) are plotted above the diagonal: the Russian
Federation, Slovakia, Italy and the Czech Republic. These countries are excep-
tional because they combine strong presidents with a relatively high degree of
constitutional control. Cases in the lower right-hand corner of the plot are
countries with no or weak presidents in combination with a low level of con-
stitutional control. Obviously, this pattern shows that the absence of a (strong)
president is a quasi-necessary, but not sufficient, condition for constitutional
control of the executive. The four exceptions are remarkable and unexpected
because they combine the concentration of formal powers in the hands of both
parliaments and presidents. Russia has a very strong popularly elected presi-
dent and, at the same time, a balanced relationship between the legislative and
executive powers. In the other exceptional countries, presidential power is
weaker but not lower than 0.67, in combination with a constitutional control
of 0.5 or higher. On the one hand, the identified necessary condition confirms
Linz’s (1994) hypothesis. Yet at the same time the exceptions make Linz’s
statement less absolute.
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Figure 1. The absence of presidentialism as a necessary condition for constitutional control
(U = Russian Federation Slk = Slovakia, CR = Czech Republic, IT = Italy).
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Findings
Several different combinations of causal conditions may be linked to high
levels of constitutional control, which is called ‘multiple-conjunctural causa-
tion’. A fuzzy membership in this combination of conditions is the minimum
of the membership scores in the selected sets. The analysis of sufficiency shows
that, in addition to the quasi-necessary cause of weak or no presidentialism,
there are two combinations of conditions ‘almost always’ sufficient (note that
‘•’ means ‘and’; ‘+’ means ‘or’ – in the Boolean nomenclature, uppercase indi-
cates ‘positive’ value and lowercase ‘negative’ value):
presidentialism • CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY • NEW DEMOC-
RACY, presidentialism • CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY • thick 
constitution.
These two expressions can be minimized to this solution:
presidentialism • CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY • (NEW DEMOC-
RACY + thick constitution).
The maximum of the two conditions ‘new democracy’ and the ‘absence of a
thick constitution’ provides the value of this logical or combination, but the
minimum score of all conditions determines the ultimate sufficiency score of
the solution, as presented in Figure 2 (Ragin 2000: 304). The fuzzy-set analy-
sis leads to this conclusion: a high level of formal constitutional control of the
executive is found in countries with: (1) no or weak presidentialism, (2) a con-
sensus democracy and (3) either a new democracy or the absence of a thick
constitution.
The plot of sufficient conditions in Figure 2 is a mirror image of Figure 1.
In the case of sufficiency, an upper-triangular pattern indicates that several dif-
ferent combinations of conditions are conducive to constitutional control of
the executive. Four cases are exceptional because the combined scores of the
sufficient conditions are higher than the scores of the outcome so that they
are not part of the subset of the outcome. This means that we would have
expected a higher degree of constitutional control in these countries, given the
relatively favorable conditions. It is striking that most exceptions have encoun-
tered a form of regime change in the postwar period. The collapse of the
French Fourth Republic, for example, has weakened the French parliament
vis-á-vis government and president because its controlling instruments are
limited by the constitution (Woldendorp et al. 2000: 212). The transformation
of the electoral system in New Zealand into proportional representation has
increased the favorable conditions for a stronger parliament.
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The fuzzy-set analysis leads to the conclusion that, in order to account for
the degree of constitutional control, all four causal conditions appear to be
relevant and none of them forms an fully adequate explanation in itself.
However, there is a serious restriction – namely that the causal expression only
confirms the direction of the relationships that are implied by the four
hypotheses in a ‘quasi-mode’. Despite this confinement, the main findings do
make sense and confirm the assumptions underlying the four main hypothe-
ses on which the analysis is based. The absence of presidentialism enhances
constitutional control because presidents are inclined to concentrate execu-
tive and legislative powers which weaken parliaments (Linz’s hypothesis).
Consensus democracies can, in some instances, be sufficient for constitutional
control because power-sharing gives parliaments a say in collective decision-
making (as is hypothesized by Lijphart), but it does so only in combination
with weak or no presidentialism. This combination confirms Lijphart’s
assumption that consensus democracy vitually rules out presidential or semi-
presidential forms of government. The absence of a rigid constitution gives
parliaments and Heads of State more room to maneuver and is therefore con-
ducive to (but not decisive for) constitutional control (as stated by Lane &
Ersson). Finally, new democracies are inclined to assign significant formal
powers to parliaments and/or Heads of State in order to prevent a fallback
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Figure 2. Sufficient conditions for constitutional control (LT = Lithuania, FR = France,
NZ = New Zealand, TU = Turkey).
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into authoritarianism. However, none of these four isolated factors is strictly
necessary or sufficient.
Fuzzy-sets compared with crisp sets
It is has been shown that fuzzy-sets allow one to go beyond the presence/
absence on which dichotomous are based. However, how much ‘added value’
do fuzzy-sets bring, compared to crisp sets? The latter already provide some
interesting explanations that take multiple conjunctural causation into
account, so that the added value of fuzzy-sets cannot be taken for granted. So,
what is the improvement? This question can be answered by performing a crisp
set analysis on the same data (as presented in Table 1). In principle, there are
four scenarios.
First, if the crisp set test reveals many contradictions, then this is a clear
demonstration that fuzzy-sets bring much added value (as the occurrence of
contradictory configurations means that Boolean minimization cannot be
envisaged other than by restricting the analysis to cases with clear outcomes).
Second, if those tests allow one to reach solutions (minimal equations) that
are less parsimonious than the solutions reached with fuzzy-sets, then this is a
demonstration that fuzzy-sets bring added value. Third, if those tests provide
different solutions to those reached with fuzzy-sets (but solutions that are just
as parsimonious, no more, no less) then there would be room to discuss on
theoretical grounds which solutions are more ‘relevant’ or ‘interesting’.
Fourth, if those tests provide exactly the same solutions as the ones reached
with fuzzy-sets, then this would mean that fuzzy-sets do not bring added value
and that the extra work is not useful.
In order to perform a crisp set analysis, the fuzzy-sets have to be trans-
formed into binary scores. The dichotomy ‘threshold’ (between the ‘0’ and ‘1’
values) is placed between the ‘0.33’ and ‘0.5’ values (i.e., placing the bar low
for all four conditions and for the outcome: their presence becomes more
likely). As a rule for including configurations in the Truth Table, a minimum
frequency is used of 2 for ‘0 configurations’ and 4 for ‘1 configurations’. This
decision is based on two considerations. One is that a higher frequency (like
3 for ‘0 configurations’ and 5 for ‘1 configurations’) would be preferable, but
leads to a loss of 85 per cent of the cases due to contradictions. The other is
that the 2:4 ratio is to some extent justified by the low dichotomy threshold
used to transform fuzzy-sets into binary scores. As a consequence, 40 per cent
of the cases is dropped due to contradictory outcomes. This confirms Hypoth-
esis 1: The many contradictions indicate the capacity of the fuzzy-set approach
to generalize (be it in a ‘quasi-mode’), whereas the crisp sets approach 
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performs much worse. The output code of each configuration can be one of
the following possibilities (for a full elaboration on this issue, see Ragin 1987;
Drass 2000):
0 Configurations: For all cases in these kinds of configurations the outcome
is absent.
1 Configurations: For all cases in these kinds of configurations the outcome
is present.
– Configurations: For all cases in these kinds of configurations the
researcher decided to assign the ‘Don’t Care’ option. This allows the
computer to treat these configurations having either outcome present or
having the outcome absent, depending on the situation.
Contradictions: Not all cases of these kinds of configurations have the same
outcome value.
Remainders: These are configurations with no cases in the data set.
The Truth Table will be minimized according to a given specification that
results in the crisp set solution. In order to prevent some arbitrary choices
having a strong impact on the outcome, the six most common ways of analy-
sis and their crisp set solutions are reported in Table 2.
Solutions 1, 3 and 5 to which Table 2 refers are:
CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY • NEW DEMOCRACY • (thick consti-
tution + presidentialism)
Solutions 2, 4 and 6 are:
CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY • NEW DEMOCRACY
It should be stressed that the outcomes of the crisp set and fuzzy-set
approaches can hardly be compared because the former applies to only 60 per
cent of the cases. When we disregard this important fact, the crisp set analy-
sis suggests an alternative explanation that is as parsimonious as the fuzzy-set
solution. Whereas the latter focuses on the combination of weak presiden-
tialism and a strong consensus democracy, the former emphasizes the combi-
nation of consensus democracy and new democracy. Is this solution better than
the one offered by the fuzzy-set logic? First of all, both outcomes do not totally
contradict each other since both stress consensus democracy as an important
condition. Second, the crisp set solution cannot be generalized and it is arrived
at after transforming fuzzy-sets into crisp sets (i.e., by deleting information)
which makes the crisp sets less informative. Hence, this comparison leads to
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the conclusion that, although crisp set solutions are in this case as parsimo-
nious as fuzzy-set solutions, it is impossible to generalize to whole of the 
population since 40 per cent of the cases is dropped due to contradictory 
outcomes.
In sum, the first and probably most important value added of the fuzzy-set
analysis is the problem (faced immediately when constructing the crisp analy-
sis) of dichotomizing. Here it is done in a relatively mechanistic manner (and
there are many other ways to do it), each way, in the end, resulting in differ-
ent ‘findings’. Another ‘value-added’ is that the crisp analysis is not oriented
toward looking for necessary conditions and in fact is likely to miss them when
they do exist. Basically, in crisp set analysis, the more limited the data in their
diversity, the greater the role of simplifying assumptions. The greater this role
is, the more likely it is that necessary conditions will be missed. This means
that the main point of contrast between the two results is the necessary con-
dition revealed in the fuzzy-set analysis.
Discussion
The constitutional control of executives cannot be explained by dichotomies
alone. The fuzzy-set analysis has shown that a high level of formal constitu-
tional control of the executive is ‘almost always’ found in countries with: (1)
no or weak presidentialism, (2) a consensus democracy and (3) either a new
democracy or the absence of a thick constitution. This statement incorporates
elements of all four hypotheses formulated by Lijphart, Linz, Lane and Ersson,
and Schmidt. This conjunctive explanation of constitutional control makes
sense because the ideal types, which still dominate the literature, have in reality
been replaced by hybrid systems that combine elements of different worlds.
This also accounts for the ‘quasiness’ of both the sufficient and necessary 
conditions.
The main conclusion of this article could not be arrived at easily with the
conventional qualitative and quantitative techniques. The identification of 
necessary and sufficient conditions and the countries that form an exception
would have been less straightforward (Ragin 2000; Braumoeller & Goertz
2000). These exceptions could not be discovered by conventional residual
analysis because they are not evoked by extreme or deviant scores. Only the
combination of scores is exceptional. Whereas fuzzy-set analysis reveals the
presence of necessary and causal conditions, quantitative correlational analy-
sis can only indicate the association of two variables, but not their set-
theoretic relationship (i.e., one being a subset of the other).
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When crisp sets are compared with fuzzy-sets it turns out that they share
many qualities since both are able to capture complexity, examine various
determinants at the same time, enable multicausal explanation, allow one to
study diversity, identify constellations of causal conditions, etc. The main draw-
back of crisp sets is the loss of information which leads to a less reliable, but
not necessarily less parsimonious, outcome.
Similarly, fuzzy-sets also overlap with qualitative analysis in the sense that
both have an eye for peculiarities of individual cases, especially those that are
not consistent with the hypothesized causal effect. On the other hand, fuzzy-
set analysis also has advantages compared to qualitative analysis. An example
of this type of research is found in the compilation of country studies of the
functioning of parliaments by Kurian (1998). The main conclusion that can be
drawn from these case studies is that formal powers do not always lead to
actual impact of parliaments (as in the case of most Eastern European democ-
racies) and the lack of formal powers also does not automatically mean that
a parliament is powerless. The drawback of Kurian’s descriptive approach is
that the functioning of parliaments is merely depicted as varied and diverse,
and it does not unravel systematic patterns behind these differences. This is
exactly what the fuzzy-set logic allows one to do. This does not mean that this
new method can replace the other approaches. Qualitative case studies on
executive-legislative relations are still necessary in order to account for
deviant cases. Quantitative studies are still necessary in order to arrive at gen-
eralizations and hypotheses. Evidently, the fuzzy-set logic is not always the
best way to study causal conditions. It is only applicable to a not-so-large
number of countries for which no time series are available and for which only
a small number of causal conditions are relevant.
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Notes
1. In the Russian Federation, the administration is only indirectly responsible to parliament
and therefore not comparable to the other countries. It is included in the analysis because
of its significance due to the size of its population.
2. Several countries are excluded: The Bahamas because of too many missing data. The
United States because of the independent position of the executive – Congress cannot
send away the President and therefore has a limited control of the executive. Congress
cannot initiate an alternation of power: it neither selects or unseats the chief executive
and is therefore not a ‘parliament’ in the British sense. Switzerland because its govern-
ing committee cannot be dismissed by the parliament and because the referendum instru-
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Appendix: Operationalization of the outcome: The constitutional control
of the executive by parliaments and Heads of State
Variable Description
Parliamentary Extent to which parliament is dominant over government. This 
dominance cumulative index is constructed by adding up scores of: vote of 
(Parlgov) investiture is necessary condition to govern (1.0) and vote of
confidence is necessary condition to continue to govern (1.0).
Executive Extent to which government is dominant over parliament. It is 
dominance by adding up scores of: government can ignore losing a vote of 
(Govparl) constructed confidence (0.5) and government (or prime minister)
can dissolve parliament (1.0) (if shared with Head of State, then
0.5).
Dominance of Extent to which the Head of State can influence the composition 
Head of State and continuation of the existence of a government. It indicates 
(Hosgov) the independent power of the Head of State (HoS) vis-à-vis
Parliament. This variable is constructed by adding up the scores
of: HoS is directly involved in the formation of government (0.5),
HoS can dissolve parliament (0.5) and HoS also has executive
powers (1.0).
Executive control Extent to which the relationship between the executive and 
(dependent legislative powers is more/less balanced. This variable is a 
variable) composite index constructed on the basis of the foregoing three
variables. A positive score implies dominance of parliament over
the executive powers (including the Head of State); a negative
score implies dominance of government and/or Head of State
over parliament. The closer the score is to 0, the more balanced
the relationship between executive and legislative powers in a
parliamentary democratic polity is assumed to be. The scores are
computed by deducting the sum of (Hosgov + Govparl) from
Parlgov.
Source: Woldendorp et al. 2000: 56–57.
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ment makes it different from a parliamentary system of government. Also excluded are
all other systems that are either unlimited presidential or low on democraticness (mea-
sured by means of the Freedom House indicators) or one-party systems of governance
or too small in size (like most of Caribbean Islands, of which Jamaica and Guyana are
sampled to represent the rest). Although small in size, Malta is included because it is an
established democracy. On the Freedom House index (‘1’ = democracy high; ‘7’ = democ-
racy low), 80 per cent of the countries has a score lower than or equal to 2. On Jaggers
and Gurr’s index (‘1’ = low on democracy; ‘10’ = high on democracy), 85 per cent of the
countries scores 8 or higher. This implies that a few countries are included that are less
stable and democratic than the established democracies in the OECD. The reason for
this is that, since the democratization gulf in the 1990s, many new democracies have
entered the democratized world so the dividing line between democracies and non-
democracies has been blurred. This is reflected in the selection of cases.
3. FS/QCA stands for ‘Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis’ and is developed by
Kriss Drass and Charles Ragin. The program is downloadable from: http://smalln.spri.
ucl.ac.be, and its manual from: http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin (consulted 12 April
2002).
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